Gustavo Oliveira Teles de Menezes
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 20, n. 3, e1578, 2025
1-25
Transforming Ukraine:
state-society relations and Russia’s
2022 invasion of Ukraine
1
Transformando a Ucrânia:
relações Estado-sociedade e a invasão
russa à Ucrânia de 2022
Transformando Ucrania: relaciones
Estado-sociedad y la invasión rusa a
Ucrania de 2022
DOI: 10.21530/ci.v20n3.2025.1578
Gustavo Oliveira Teles de Menezes
2
Abstract
This article analyzes Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine,
seeking to explain the motivations behind Russia’s decision to carry
out this action. With a perspective that draws attention to great
powers’ perceptions about the connections between other states’
domestic politics and the global balance of power, the paper argues
that Russia, with the 2022 invasion, sought to reverse trends in
state-society relations in Ukraine which influenced both foreign
and domestic policies in a direction that Moscow considered
detrimental to its interests regarding Ukraine.
Keywords: Russo-Ukrainian War, State-society Relations, Great
Powers.
1 This study was financed in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de
Pessoal de Nível Superior – Brasil (CAPES) – Finance Code 001.
2 PhD in International Relations at the San Tiago Dantas International Relations
Graduate Program (Unesp, Unicamp, PUC-SP), São Paulo – SP, Brasil. Researcher
at the Brazilian National Institute of Science and Technology for Studies on
the United States (INCT-INEU). (gustavotm91@gmail.com). ORCID: https://
orcid.org/0000-0002-5410-0942.
Artigo submetido em 07/05/2025 e aprovado em 10/02/2026.
ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE
RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS
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ISSN 2526-9038
Transforming Ukraine: state-society relations and Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 20, n. 3, e1578, 2025
2-25
Resumo
Este artigo analisa a invasão russa em larga escala à Ucrânia de 2022, objetivando explicar
as motivações por trás da decisão da Rússia em realizar tal ação. Com uma perspetiva que
chama atenção para as percepções das grandes potências sobre as ligações entre a política
doméstica de outros Estados e o equilíbrio de poder internacional, o trabalho argumenta
que a Rússia, com a invasão de 2022, buscou reverter tendências nas relações Estado-
sociedade na Ucrânia que influenciavam as políticas doméstica a externa do país de um
maneira considerada por Moscou como prejudicial para seus interesses quanto à Ucrânia.
Palavras-chave: Guerra Russo-Ucraniana, Relações Estado-sociedade, Grandes potências.
Resumen
Este artículo analiza la invasión rusa a gran escala a Ucrania de 2022, con el objetivo de
explicar las motivaciones detrás de la decisión de Rusia de realizar tal acción. Con una
perspectiva que llama la atención sobre las percepciones de las grandes potencias sobre
los vínculos entre la política interna de otros estados y el equilibrio internacional de poder,
el artículo sostiene que Rusia, con la invasión de 2022, buscó revertir tendencias en las
relaciones Estado-sociedad en Ucrania que influenciaban las políticas interna y externa
del país de una manera que Rusia consideraba perjudicial para sus intereses en Ucrania.
Palabras clave: Guerra Ruso-ucraniana, Relaciones Estado-Sociedad, Grandes potencias.
1. Introduction
Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine generated heated debates about the
reasons why Vladimir Putin’s government carried out this action. Explanations in
the literature can be divided into three main currents: realist, liberal and empire.
Realism in International Relations (IR) is an internally diverse theoretical
tradition. Nevertheless, it is possible to summarize that realist interpretations
tend to revolve around the following logic: Russia, regardless of its domestic
political characteristics, felt challenged by changes in the balance of power,
primarily related to material capabilities, in its neighborhood posed by Ukraine’s
rapprochement with the West (mainly with regard to Ukraine’s possible NATO
accession) (Mearsheimer 2022; Walt 2023). From an offensive realist point of
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view, given the inherent uncertainties regarding other states’ intentions, as well
as a cost-benefit assessment of military actions, Russia’s decisions to invade and
annex Ukrainian territories reflected states’ inexorable tendency to expand their
power and strategic advantages in conditions assessed as favorable (Dawood
and Costa 2024; Sushentsov and Wohlforth 2020). Following a defensive realist
logic, in turn, Russia’s actions could be interpreted as a reactive, limited attempt
to preserve Moscow’s claimed sphere of influence and strategic positions in the
face of the perceived threat posed by Western encroachment (D’Anieri 2019).
Unlike Realism’s tendency to downplay the importance of domestic factors,
one of the main features of the Liberal IR paradigm is the idea that states’ foreign
policies reflect their internal characteristics (Pecequilo 2016). This means the
theoretical acceptance that ideas, interests, and power coalitions coming from
society can strongly influence state policies (Moravcsik 1997). In this regard,
liberal interpretations on Russia’s Ukraine policy have focused primarily on the
political regime issue. According to this logic, states with liberal democratic
features tend to be more peaceful, since these factors would accustom their society
and leaders to cooperative and non-violent foreign policy behavior. Conversely,
states with authoritarian political regimes, in the absence of liberal democratic
values and institutions, tend towards a more aggressive foreign policy behavior,
facilitated by the lack of domestic checks and balances in relation to rulers
(Pecequilo 2016). An important consequence of this approach is the thesis that
authoritarian leaders tend to see liberal democracy as a potential threat to their
rule. Accordingly, liberal arguments commonly maintain that, by launching the
invasion, Putin aimed to consolidate his authoritarian rule by using narratives
of conflict against Ukraine and the West (Ferraro 2023), as well as to eliminate
a perceived threat posed by the existence of a democracy in Ukraine (Person
and McFaul 2022).
Finally, empire perspectives see Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion essentially
as an imperialist undertaking. Imperialism can be understood as the exercise of
power through direct conquest or forms of political and economic influence that
amount to the domination of a political center over peripheral spaces (Young
2016). Empire-centered interpretations therefore can be related to the realist
understanding of spheres of influence and tend to argue that, by launching
the 2022 full-scale invasion, Russia sought exactly to establish such kind of
imperial(ist) control over Ukraine. Importantly, according to such views, Russia’s
moves were driven mainly by Putin’s Russian imperial ideology which denies
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the historical validity of Ukrainian statehood and seeks to bring Ukraine “back”
to Russia’s control (Kuzio 2022; Plokhy 2023).
These interpretations provide valuable contributions to understanding Russia’s
actions, but also have some shortcomings. It is true that Russia has claimed a
sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, including Ukraine, ever since the Boris
Yeltsin presidency (1991-1999) (D’Anieri 2023), showing a typical great power
behavior. However, realist arguments have also been questioned. Although NATO
did not revoke its 2008 promise to admit Ukraine at some undefined moment, the
prospects of Ukraine’s actual accession were manifestly uncertain and distant on
the eve of the 2022 invasion. Furthermore, although Ukraine’s military had been
strengthening with Western support, Ukraine continued to have serious military
disadvantages compared to Russia (D’Anieri 2023). Finally, contrary to Russia’s
claims, there is no indication that Ukraine was intent on launching a large-scale
offensive against the pro-Russian separatist polities in eastern Ukraine (Strana.
ua 2023). These factors raise questions about the thesis of an imminent threat to
Russia from the military standpoint if one accepts the defensive realist argument.
True, one could argue, according to an offensive realist logic, that from Russia’s
perspective the military imbalance in Moscow’s favor could actually present an
opportunity. However, this reasoning raises the question of why Russia did not
launch the full-scale invasion in 2014-2015 instead, when the Ukrainian state
was in acute disarray and its military even weaker.
Concerning liberal views, domestic actors’ interests and worldviews have
strongly influenced Russia’s and Ukraine’s foreign policies. However, the regime
type argument is debatable in the case of Russia’s invasion: although Ukraine
did maintain stronger democratic features than Russia, the liberal thesis about an
authoritarianism vs. democracy conflict can be questioned considering authoritarian
tendencies in Ukraine since 2014 under the influence of the conflict with Russia
(Way 2019). As for the regime strengthening thesis, evidence indicates the 2022
invasion contributed to strengthening Putin’s rating and domestic power (Ferraro
2023). However, already prior to the 2022 invasion, the Putin regime had high
approval rates and drastically reduced potential dissent in Russia by repressing
domestic opposition (D’Anieri 2023), meaning that Putin already enjoyed a
favorable domestic situation. This situation is consistent with the idea that
the lack of institutional constraints increases the autonomy of an authoritarian
executive to pursue war. However, it says little about the motivations, strategy
and goals that guided Russia’s 2022 invasion in the first place.
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Finally, the idea that Ukraine is a key component of Russia’s imperial
experience, and therefore that Ukraine should be subject to some kind of Russian
control, is in fact widespread in Russian elite and society (Kasyanov 2019,;
Solchanyk 2001,). However, empire interpretations often over-emphasize the
ideological setting of the Putin elite itself, while not giving due attention to its
interaction with developments in Ukraine’s foreign and domestic policy and their
role in the assessed balance of power.
Taking into account these considerations, this article proposes an alternative
explanation about Russia’s 2022 invasion. It argues that with the 2022 invasion,
Russia sought to reverse transformations in Ukraine state-society relations that
affected both Ukraine’s foreign and domestic policies in a way seen by Moscow
as detrimental to its power interests.
This approach draws on a Gramscian perspective on state-society relations,
according to which the state acts to adapt society to ideas and behaviors aligned
with the political order favored by ruling groups. The achievement of these goals
occurs through two distinct, but connected dimensions. The first one makes use
of bureaucratic and coercive tools of the state–the “political society”–, which aim
to imbue state actions with a mandatory character over society. The second, in its
turn, occurs through hegemony, understood as the ability to secure consent to the
political order through adhesion and concessions. This dimension is associated
with the concept of “civil society,” a sphere where organizations outside state
control disseminate ideologies with hegemonic aspirations (Gramsci 2007). Such
organizations include political parties, unions, religious organizations and media
outlets.
Unlike liberal thought, which emphasizes the precedence of social actors over
the state (Moravcsik 1997), this article’s approach draws on historical sociology’s
attention to the co-constitution between state and society, as social forces can
reinforce or challenge state policies, whereas the state’s bureaucratic-coercive
power, in turn, regulates social life. Modern states have played a crucial role in
consolidating national identities through educational, linguistic, and cultural
policies, whilst various states themselves emerged from revolutions and national
movements emanating from society (Tilly 1994). More generally, changes in the
domestic balance of power among social groups, as well as transformations in
ideological attitudes and economic structure have had a major impact on state
form and policies (Cox 1981; Halliday 1994). Therefore, these historical phenomena
indicate the need for a broader understanding of power in international politics,
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which, in addition to material factors, includes the dimensions of ideology–a set
of ideas, norms and values believed to make sense of the world and guide social
relations—and regulation—a state’s ability to regulate social life in a centralized
and territorialized manner (Mann 2012).
Due to such international implications, state-society relations in a given
region have often aroused the interest of foreign states, especially great powers.
This has driven interference through political, economic, and military support
for political actors — either government or non-government ones — in the
territory of interest, as illustrated in the various cases of foreign support for
coups d’état and secessionist movements (Halliday 1994). Examples include
the armed interventions carried out by the United States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War, which aimed to transform political institutions, affect elite
power balance (by overthrowing unfriendly actors and installing friendly ones
in power), and influence the circulation of ideologies abroad. Such actions have
often occurred in neighboring territories considered to be of strategic importance
by intervening states. The transformational goals of these interventions in terms
of state-society relations evidence a perceived connection between this factor and
the balance of power (Lawson and Tardelli 2013; Owen IV 2002; Westad 2007).
Several authors have drawn attention to the implications of the state-society
factor for Russia’s Ukraine policy. The decrease of the political influence of
pro-Russian forces, the failure of the Minsk process and the strengthening of
Ukrainian national identity and state policies promoting it in 2014-2021 have
been particularly highlighted (D’Anieri 2023; Kudelia 2025; Ishchenko 2023;
Popova and Shevel 2024). Others stressed that Russia’s interests encompass not
only Kyiv’s geopolitical reorientation, but also reshaping Ukraine’s domestic
political order in a Russia-friendly way (Stanovaya 2025). Employing a Gramsci-
inspired approach, Volodymyr Ishchenko (2023) argued that the predominance
of the nationalist and pro-Western development model in Ukraine since the
Maidan resulted to a significant extent from the inability of certain sectors of the
Ukrainian elite to articulate, in the civil society sphere, an alternative national
development project with domestic and foreign policies more consonant with
Russia’s interests.
This article contributes to this literature by providing an analysis of Russian
thinking and policies regarding state-society relations in Ukraine as a broader
historical process throughout the post-Soviet period. Furthermore, it also analyzes
how the Russian government and its supporters positioned themselves on this
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issue since the beginning of the 2022 full-scale invasion. Finally, from an IR
theoretical perspective, the article refines aspects of the realist (the notions of
balance of power and spheres of influence), liberal (the influence of domestic
actors) and empire (great powers’ tendency to strive for control over peripheral
spaces) interpretations with the inputs of its state-society approach.
Considering the historical particularities of Russian-Ukrainian relations, this
article analyzes Russia’s thinking and policies regarding two central dimensions
of state-society relations in Ukraine: the exercise of state power, in the sphere
of political society, and hegemonic disputes, in the sphere of civil society. In
methodological terms, the first dimension directs the analysis to Russia’s approach
regarding Ukraine’s policies in the following areas: state structure, political
competition, foreign policy and national identity. The second, in turn, focuses
on the ideological setting in Ukrainian society, considering the prospects for
ideological hegemony and the rise to power of different social forces in the
country. This involves analyzing the actions and programs of relevant political
parties and other actors in Ukrainian society, and how Russia interacted with
these factors. Public opinion trends in Ukraine are also analyzed. In view of these,
the article argues that trends and events in both dimensions influenced Russia’s
balance of power assessments and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
2. Shaping independent Ukraine: Russia between Yeltsin’s
moderation and nationalist expansionism (1991-1999)
Debates in Russia have seen involvement in state-society dynamics as a key
factor in ensuring Russian influence in the post-Soviet space. Already in 1992,
the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP), a leading think tank known
for its connections with Russia’s political elite, advocated the development of
relations with Russians and Russian speakers in the region. The guarantee of their
rights was described as an important goal, with the use of force to achieve it not
being ruled out. Furthermore, the SVOP recommended that Russia strengthen
relations with foreign actors who advocated policies in line with Russian regional
interests (SVOP 1992).
From this point of view, Ukraine seemed a promising target. According to the
2001 census, ethnic Russians were 17% of Ukraine’s population, concentrated
in the south and east, with Russians being a 60% majority in Crimea. An even
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larger share spoke mostly Russian, mainly in southeastern Ukraine—where
demands for regional autonomy, an official status for Russian, and participation
in Russia-led regional projects were common (Solchanyk 2001). Furthermore,
in the 1990s many Ukrainians attributed the country’s economic decline to the
severance of ties with Russia. In Ukraine’s 1994 presidential election, Leonid
Kuchma, an eastern Ukrainian who campaigned advocating the restoration of
ties with Russia and making Russian a state language, won the election with a
massive vote in the south-east (D’Anieri 2023,; Solchanyk 2001). In Crimea, whose
1954 transfer to Soviet Ukraine was widely contested in Russia, a movement
with pro-Russian inclinations, including supporters of territorially joining Russia,
threatened Ukraine’s integrity.
In this context, prominent Russian politicians and intellectuals, particularly
Yeltsin’s opponents, advocated for the development of ties with Russians and
Russian speakers, and an active involvement in efforts at shaping Ukrainian state-
society relations (Klimin 2009). In this regard, proposals by Konstantin Zatulin,
the main ideologue of Russia’s Ukraine policy in parliament, are illustrative.
Zatulin argued that Russia should support a pro-Russian political bloc in Ukraine
and that only a federalized Ukraine, with an empowered autonomous south-east,
would make Ukraine a Russia-friendly country (Zatulin and Migranyan 1997).
This highlights the perception that Moscow should interfere in the state-society
co-constitution driven by the interplay between the political society (changing
Ukraine’s state structure by empowering southeastern provinces) and the civil
society (supporting pro-Russian actors in Ukraine) to ensure a Russia-friendly
order in Ukraine.
To some extent, the Yeltsin government engaged in efforts to shape Ukrainian
state-society relations, as illustrated by the 1997 Russian-Ukrainian Treaty on
Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership, which resulted in mutual commitments to
protect ethnic, language and cultural identities. However, Yeltsin’s approach differed
from the more interventionist ones. Ukraine’s 1996 constitution, while defining
Ukrainian as the sole state language, guaranteed the free use of Russian and the
equality of citizens regardless of ethnicity. Nonetheless, many Russian politicians
accused Ukraine of suppressing Russian identity and language, demanding
stronger guarantees for their protection. Yeltsin’s Russia at times did criticize
Ukraine’s policies, but did not embrace a more interventionist approach (Klimin
2009). These differences were also present in the Crimea question. While the
Russian parliament adopted declarations questioning Ukrainian sovereignty and
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even claiming jurisdiction in Crimea, Yeltsin committed to Ukraine’s territorial
integrity, contributing to a form of regional autonomy that did not challenge
Ukraine’s unitary state structure (Sasse 2007).
3. Intensified engagement: the Putin era (2000-2013)
Vladimir Putin’s presidency was a turning point in Russia’s foreign policy,
owing to Putin’s ideological profile, strong economic growth in the 2000s, and
developments in Russia-Ukraine and Russia-West relations. Central to Putin’s
worldview is the defense of Russia’s great power status, including through
military power. In domestic politics, Putin promoted greater state control of
the economy, administrative centralization and regime primacy over political
processes (Sakwa 2020). Therefore, Russia was capable and willing to pursue
a more assertive foreign policy, with Putin considering Russian influence over
Ukraine a priority (Zygar 2023).
This was illustrated in Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election, when Russia
supported the candidate of the Party of Regions (PoR), Viktor Yanukovych,
with public appearances with Putin and the work of Kremlin-aligned political
strategists in his campaign (Petrov and Ryabov 2006). The main party of the
pro-Russian electorate, the PoR was led mainly by the Donbas (Donetsk and
Luhansk oblasts) political-oligarchic clan. It advocated for policies such as
keeping Ukraine out of NATO (D’Anieri 2023), with Yanukovych’s campaign also
stressing the officialization of the Russian language and the free functioning of
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church — Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), which had
links with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). In contrast, Yanukovych’s rival,
Viktor Yushchenko, was a pro-Western candidate who identified with Ukrainian
nationalist views in identity issues. While the election held in November 2004
was won by Yanukovych with a massive vote in southeastern Ukraine, evidence
of large-scale fraud led to the Orange Revolution protests, concentrated in Kyiv,
central and western Ukraine. Putin recognized Yanukovych’s victory, while the
Western powers supported the protesters’ demands. Another election round
was held, won by Yushchenko. However, this solution was made possible by a
compromise whereby the presidential powers would be reduced, meaning the
PoR elite could retain power through parliament and the post of prime minister
(Arel and Driscoll 2023). This compromise appeased more radical ideas, such
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as the threat, raised at the PoR-led November 2004 Sievierodonetsk Congress,
of establishing an autonomous republic in southeastern Ukraine with possible
Russian support (Arel and Driscoll 2023; Skhidnyi Variant 2009).
Nonetheless, the outcome of the Orange Revolution intensified Russia’s
view of a great power struggle over Ukraine, heightening the perceived urgency
of engaging in Ukrainian state-society relations. In 2005, Zatulin, member of
United Russia — the party supporting Putin — reiterated that only a federalized
Ukraine, with Russian as a state language and united UOC-MP and ROC, could
guarantee long-term friendly relations with Russia (Zatulin 2005). Importantly,
the PoR and United Russia strengthened their ties in Donbas, while members
of the Putin elite established relations with other pro-Russian actors in eastern
Ukraine (Skorkin 2016). Furthermore, Russia maintained ties with the head of
Kuchma’s presidential cabinet (2002—2005), Viktor Medvedchuk, who became
Putin’s closest partner in Ukraine (Zygar 2023). Segments of Ukrainian civil
society were seen as potential Russian allies against Yushchenko, for instance
regarding NATO accession: a SVOP working group recommended that Russian
NGOs support Ukrainian civil society actors opposed to it and suggested a
referendum on the issue (Belkin 2008) at a time when opposition was the
prevalent position in Ukraine.
Yushchenko also sought to create an independent Orthodox Church in
Ukraine, separated from the ROC. Many Ukrainians believed this would diminish
the hegemonic potential of pro-Russian forces, strengthening Ukrainian national
identity. Additionally, Ukraine’s memory policies under Yushchenko advocated
that the 1930s famine was a genocide perpetrated by the Soviet regime, and that
members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its armed
wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), were national heroes. The OUN-
UPA were anti-Soviet, radical nationalist organizations centered in the west of
contemporary Ukraine which sought independence during the interwar and World
War II (WWII) periods. Members of the OUN-UPA persecuted other nationalities
(particularly Jews and Poles) and at times allied with Nazi Germany (Popova and
Shevel 2024), facts which are often glossed over or denied by their supporters.
Russia strongly opposed these policies, especially as the Putin regime sought to
consolidate society around the idea of Russia as the heir to Soviet greatness and
WWII victory. The Russian government considered that Yushchenko’s use of
state power to advance such identity policies aimed to weaken Russian influence
in Ukraine (Kasyanov 2019).
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In 2008, Putin ally Dmitry Medvedev became Russia’s president. Despite
his reputation as a liberal and westernist, Medvedev continued Putin’s regional
approach (Tsygankov 2022). This was evidenced in the 2008 Russo-Georgian
War over the breakaway region of South Ossetia, whose secession hampered
Georgia’s NATO accession. Importantly, Moscow strengthened its claims to be
the protector of Russians and Russian speakers abroad by framing its actions
as a humanitarian intervention to protect its citizens (a large share of South
Ossetia’s inhabitants had Russian citizenship) and recognizing South Ossetia’s
(and Abkhazia’s) independence invoking self-determination. Further evidencing
the perceived importance of state-society relations as an element of the balance
of power, Medvedev believed that parts of Ukrainian society could effectively
become Russia’s allies in countering state-promoted pro-NATO and nationalist
identity policies under Yushchenko. Medvedev even publicly stated the hope for
a new leadership in Ukraine (Medvedev 2009) and sources indicate that Russia
took steps to facilitate an alliance between Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko
against Yushchenko (Zygar 2023).
Russia’s prospects in Ukraine improved after Yanukovych was elected president
in 2010 with no ostensible Russian involvement beyond United Russia publicly
declaring support for the PoR candidate (United Russia 2009). The Yanukovych
government, although developing relations with the European Union (EU), declared
Ukraine’s military neutrality and authorized the extension of the Russian Black
Sea fleet’s basing rights in Crimea. Furthermore, Yushchenko’s WWII memory
approach was replaced by policies closer to Russian perspectives. Finally, in
2012, the so-called Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law was passed, allowing the official
use of Russian at the regional level. Therefore, although the PoR abandoned its
federalist discourse, Ukrainian state-society relations under Yanukovych moved
closer to Moscow’s preferences.
4. From crisis to full-scale invasion: the Maidan and Russia’s
attempt to transform Ukraine by force (2013-2025)
With Putin’s return to presidency in 2012, Russian foreign policy gained
more conservative and nationalist tones, as well as a more confrontational
attitude towards the West. This was due to factors like the 2011-2012 protests
in Russia, which Putin saw as instigated by the US, and Western interference
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in the Middle East. This approach was reflected on Russia’s intensified efforts
at military strengthening, especially after the 2014 Ukraine crisis, as well as
at leading regional integration projects (Sakwa 2020; Tsygankov 2022). In this
context, Russia sought to attract Ukraine to its orbit by influencing Ukrainian
state-society dynamics.
Leaks and journalistic investigations indicate Putin aide Sergey Glaziev
authored a plan which proposed establishing a sort of pro-Russian movement
in Ukraine in support of Kyiv’s adhesion to the Russia-led Customs Union.
This movement would include leaders from southeastern Ukraine, UOC-MP
adepts, and members of the more pro-Russian wing of the PoR (Dzerkalo tyzhnia
2013). In 2013, Glaziev and Medvedchuk held conferences in Ukraine promoting
Russia-led regional initiatives (Skorkin 2016), while Glaziev threatened an armed
intervention connected to appeals by pro-Russian Ukrainians should Kyiv sign an
Association Agreement (AA) with the EU (D’Anieri 2023,). Uncertain about the
economic benefits of the EU deal, and under intense Russian pressure, Yanukovych
suspended AA negotiations in November 2013 (D’Anieri 2023; Sakwa 2015). This
decision led to the Maidan protests led by pro-Western segments of Ukrainian
society, which also reflected discontent with authoritarianism and state capture
under Yanukovych. With repression by the authorities and the radicalization of
the movement, the Maidan began to seek Yanukovych’s departure from power.
Russia, in turn, sought to sustain Yanukovych by providing economic support
(D’Anieri 2023) and, according to Ukrainian sources, weapons used by Ukrainian
security forces to suppress the protests (Koshkina 2015). However, Yanukovych
was eventually deposed by the parliament in February 2014, an action considered
by Moscow as a West-instigated coup d’état. A new interim government composed
of PoR opponents came to power, while Yanukovych fled to Russia.
The Maidan also worried Moscow due to the presence of Ukrainian nationalism.
Despite being a minority, Ukrainian far-right groups of anti-Russian orientation
played an important role in the protests (D’Anieri 2023, 206), leading individuals
from this milieu to take up some positions in the interim government, including in
security (Sakwa 2015). Furthermore, the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law was repealed
in parliament. Although not approved by acting president Oleksandr Turchynov,
the repeal foreshadowed that Ukrainian state-society relations would move away
from Russian preferences. To counter this, Russia supported pro-Russian protesters
in southeastern Ukraine who opposed the Maidan. They voiced demands like
the officialization of the Russian language, regional autonomy, federalization or
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even secession, while appealing for Russia’s support (Arel and Driscoll 2023;
Kudelia 2025). In February 2014, actors from the southeastern elite organized
a Sievierodonetsk-like congress in Kharkiv claiming the primacy of regional
authorities over Kyiv. The congress was attended by Russian politicians and the
consul in Kharkiv (Mediaport 2014). In March 2014, a Russian government plan
proposed solving the crisis through measures directed both at the political and
civil societies, including Ukraine’s federalization and military neutrality, making
Russian a state language and curbing Ukrainian nationalist organizations (Russia
2014). At the same time, claiming to protect Russians, Russians speakers and
their right to self-determination, Russia allied with sectors of Crimea’s elite to
annex the region amid pro-Russian manifestations (Arel and Driscoll 2023). In
the post-annexation period, pro-Ukrainian intelligentsia largely left Crimea, while
thousands of Russians settled in the region. There was also a significant exodus
of Crimean Tatars, with pro-Kyiv Tatar institutions and leaders being harassed
(Lewis 2025; Matveeva 2018).
Outside Crimea, pro-Russian secessionism failed in southeastern Ukraine, as
regional elites remained mostly loyal to the Ukrainian state and popular support
for secession and annexation by Russia was far lower (Arel and Driscoll 2023).
Donbas, the region with the highest rate of support for annexation by Russia
outside Crimea — estimated at about 30% in April 2014 (KIIS 2014)—and site
of a greater degree of elite passivity or defection to pro-Russian secessionism
(Kudelia 2025), was the single exception to this rule. In April 2014, separatists
declared the founding of the pro-Russian Donetsk (DNR) and Luhansk (LNR)
People’s Republics. With Ukraine’s military response to the armed secessionist
insurgency, events in Donbas developed into a war.
Support for the Donbas separatists came from Russia in various forms.
For example, leaks and journalistic investigations indicate Russian officials and
politicians provided guidance to separatists. Furthermore, Russian citizens—
including from nationalist and far-right circles—joined the Donbas insurgency.
Finally, Russia, in addition to providing weapons to DNR/LNR forces, directly
intervened militarily in Donbas in 2014 and early 2015 (Hauter 2023; Kudelia 2025).
Attempts to end the conflict centered on the Minsk platform, launched in 2014.
The February 2015 Minsk Agreement (Minsk II), signed by Russia, Ukraine, and
DNR and LNR leaders, provided for the reintegration of the DNR/LNR-controlled
territories into the Ukrainian state with autonomy and local security forces (OSCE
2015). The DNR and LNR kept control over a significant portion of Donbas,
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including regional capitals Donetsk and Luhansk, with Russia providing military
and economic support and consolidating its role in the political management of
these areas (Kudelia 2025; Matveeva 2018). Despite occasional ceasefire disruptions,
the Minsk II frontlines generally held until Russia’s 2022 invasion.
After the Maidan, the idea of the political empowerment of the south-east
and of pro-Russian political forces in Ukraine gained renewed strength in Russia
(Lukyanov 2014). These proposals were even more important for Russia considering
the consequences of the 2014 events. First, the annexation of Crimea and the
de facto secession of DNR/LNR-controlled areas removed a significant share
of the pro-Russian electorate from Ukrainian politics (D’Anieri 2023). Second,
according to opinion polls, negative views on Russia in Ukraine jumped from
an average 8% to almost 43% after the 2014 events; positive views, in turn,
fell from around 86% to 42% (KIIS 2022). Additionally, polls showed growing
support for EU and NATO accession (Popova and Shevel 2024,),3 with Ukraine
making these constitutional goals. In parallel, the Ukrainian military began to
strengthen and modernize with Western support (D’Anieri 2023), and Western
influence grew in Ukrainian politics.
There was also growing adherence to Ukrainian national identity and
nationalism (Popova and Shevel, 2024); despite their poor electoral performance,
Ukrainian nationalist groups became influential political actors, often with close
ties to the state (Arel and Driscoll 2023). Nationalist narratives became increasingly
accepted in mainstream politics, as illustrated by laws that recognized OUN-UPA
members as Ukraine independence fighters and equated Soviet socialism with
WWII Nazi occupation as totalitarian regimes. Furthermore, the Orthodox Church
of Ukraine was established in 2019 with state support as an autocephalous church
aspiring to replace the UOC-MP, a move strongly condemned by Russia. Finally,
new legislation promoting the Ukrainian language was adopted (D’Anieri 2023;
Popova and Shevel 2024). These intertwined trends in Ukrainian political and
civil society created serious challenges to Russian interests in Ukraine.
To counter these trends, Russia’s Ukraine strategy relied primarily on the
reintegration of DNR/LNR-controlled areas, aiming to increase the presence of pro-
Russian leaders and voters in Ukrainian politics. Achieving these goals, however,
proved difficult. Ever since Petro Poroshenko’s presidency (2014-2019), Ukraine
3 While the exclusion of Crimea and DNR/LNR-controlled areas contributed to such results, similar trends,
considering regional differences, were also observed in Kyiv-controlled south-east.
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was reluctant to implement Minsk II’s reintegration provisions, which were
rejected by a large share of Ukrainian society and political elite that considered
the country to be at war with Russia. From this perspective, the reintegration
of separatist-controlled regions would effectively mean the establishment of a
Russian enclave in Ukraine (Arel and Driscoll 2023).
Another key feature of Russia’s strategy was to support a pro-Russian force
in Ukrainian party politics. Journalistic investigations allege that Russia was
involved in efforts to form an alliance between Medvedchuk and former PoR
politicians (Koshkina 2018). In 2018, the Opposition Platform — For Life (OPZZh)
party was created, centered on an alliance between Medvedchuk and a faction
of the PoR and later the Opoblok, a PoR successor party, led by Yuri Boiko
and Serhiy Lyovochkin. The OPZZh advocated the protection of the Russian
language, memory policies opposed to the post-Maidan line, the free functioning
of the UOC-MP, Ukraine’s military neutrality and the implementation of Minsk
II stressing Donbas autonomy (OPZZh n.d.). Russian support for OPZZh was
evidenced by Russian state media links with Medvedchuk-linked TV channels,
as well as by Russian officials’ meetings with OPZZh leaders during Ukrainian
electoral campaigns. Moscow also imposed sanctions on Opoblok members who
did not join the OPZZh.
Volodymyr Zelensky’s coming to power as president of Ukraine in 2019
raised expectations of changes, as Zelensky stressed the need for a negotiated
peace in Donbas and avoided controversial national identity issues. Another
hope for Russia was the OPZZh’s electoral results: coming second in the 2019
parliamentary election, behind only Zelensky’s Servant of the People party
(though far away); and winning several southeastern oblasts in the 2020 regional
elections. However, amid strong internal opposition, Zelensky adopted an approach
similar to Poroshenko’s regarding the Minsk process (D’Anieri 2023; Ishchenko
2023) and made no major changes in the post-Maidan line of identity policies
(Plokhy 2023). Ukrainian state-society relations kept distancing from Putin’s
interests, taking a drastic worsening in 2021. In February, Ukrainian authorities
blocked Medvedchuk-linked TV channels under accusations of illegal relations
with Donbas separatists and Russian funding (D’Anieri, 2023; Popova and Shevel
2024). Medvedchuk and members of his OPZZh wing were also targeted by
Ukrainian sanctions and, in May 2021, Medvedchuk was put under house arrest
on charges of treason by illegally cooperating with Russia. In the aftermath of
these measures, OPZZh’s positions in Ukrainian politics significantly deteriorated.
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Throughout 2021, Ukrainian sanctions also targeted other politicians and media
outlets accused of advocating pro-Russian positions.
Evidences indicate these measures played a key role in Russia’s balance
of power assessments. From the state-society co-constitution standpoint, they
pointed to a path of unprecedented restrictions on political and hegemonic
competition for actors who could influence Ukraine’s state policies in ways
favored by Russia. Shortly after Medvedchuk’s arrest, Putin denounced the
Ukrainian authorities’ actions, claiming they aimed to suppress pro-Russian
segments of Ukrainian society (Russia 2021). Russia also began a military buildup
along the Ukraine border (D’Anieri, 2023). Russian elite forces engaged in drills
whose scenario was the seizure of “enemy structures” (Shuster 2024), indicating
possible preparations for a regime change operation in Ukraine. In parallel, as
skirmishes intensified in Donbas, a new security crisis arose. US-Russia talks
led to an easing of tensions in the first half of 2021, but Russia kept troops near
the Ukrainian border. In late 2021, Russia renewed the escalation by launching
large-scale military drills (Arel and Driscoll 2023). Russia also submitted draft
security agreements to the US and NATO seeking, among other proposals, a
commitment that Ukraine would not join NATO. Negotiations, however, did not
lead to the outcomes desired by Moscow. Days before the 2022 invasion, urgent
Minsk platform negotiations failed to change Kyiv’s position on the Donbas war,
which further irritated Moscow (Solov’ev 2022).
Since 2014, amid tensions with Ukraine, nationalism was rising in Russia
too, with a growing delegitimization of the idea of independent Ukraine in
Russian official discourse (Plokhy 2023). In this regard, the July 2021 “On
the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians” article signed by Putin was a
landmark. The text has been most often remembered for the presence of Russian
imperial-nationalist theses challenging the historical foundations of Ukrainian
national identity and statehood (Plokhy 2023). However, another key feature
of the article has gone largely unnoticed: Putin argued that the rise of Russia-
friendly forces to power and the implementation of the Minsk platform were
made impossible by an anti-Russian alliance between Ukrainian nationalism
and Western geopolitical interests. Putin further claimed that Ukrainian state
and society were transforming along nationalist and anti-Russian lines, posing
an acute security threat to Russia (Putin 2021).
The aforementioned string of events was likely perceived by Putin as the
ultimate failure of Russia’s 2014-2021 Ukraine strategy, leading Russia to launch
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the 2022 full-scale invasion to impose its control over Ukraine. Pointing to the
importance of the state-society factor, Russia’s regime change goal in the invasion
was evidenced by military operations towards Kyiv and Putin’s public appeal
for the Ukrainian military to overthrow Zelensky (Russia 2022). Both before and
during the war, Western intelligence and journalistic investigations have alleged
that Russia was intent on installing a puppet government in Ukraine to be led
by Medvedchuk and members of his OPZZh wing or former PoR politicians like
Yanukovych and Oleg Tsariov (United States 2022; Kravets and Romanyuk 2023;
Strana.ua 2022). Russia is also said to have demanded Yuri Boiko’s appointment as
prime minister in peace negotiations, which was denied by Boiko and the OPZZh
(Gordon 2022). Ukrainian military resistance has prevented Russia from imposing
a regime change in Kyiv, but Russia still claims Zelensky is an illegitimate leader,
suggesting Moscow’s continuing interest in a leadership change in Ukraine.
During the war, pro-Putin intellectuals and politicians have often drawn
attention to the state-society factor, arguing that Russia’s victory should include
not only Ukraine’s military defeat, geopolitical reorientation and territorial
dismemberment, but also the dissemination of pro-Russian ideologies and the
suppression of the Ukrainian national idea in order to ensure that Ukraine becomes
friendly to Russia (Karaganov 2023; Ukraina.ru 2023; Zatulin 2022). In this sense,
military occupation allowed Moscow to carry out regime changes in Russian-
occupied areas in southeastern Ukraine. Although the overwhelming majority
of local elites condemned the Russian invasion (Ishchenko 2023; Kudelia 2025;
Lewis 2025), some politicians, often with previous careers in parties like the
PoR, OPPZh and Opoblok, and pro-Russian activists joined Moscow’s occupation
governments (Lewis 2025). In these areas, locals have faced intense pressure
to adhere to Russian rule, with reports of frequent human rights violations as
Russia has harshly repressed opposition, targeting especially individuals deemed
as potential leaders of Ukrainian resistance. Social payments, resource allocation
and bureaucratic tools, like requiring Russian citizenship and business regulations
for various needs, were also used to prompt compliance and co-opt locals (UN
Human Rights Office 2024; Lewis 2025). Demography has also been an important
factor: opponents of the Russian occupation have been expelled, while there has
been a significant influx of Russian immigrants, often stimulated by Moscow
(Lewis 2025). Estimations indicate that more than half of the pre-invasion
population, presumably including a high share of opponents to Russian rule, left
these regions. As in post-annexation Crimea and separatist-controlled Donbas,
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these demographic changes can contribute to reducing potential civil society
resistance against Russian rule. In September-October 2022, Russia declared the
annexation of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts,
including areas of these regions that were not occupied by Russian forces.
Evidence from Russia’s proposals in peace talks also shows that Russia
attempted to transform Ukraine with measures directed at both the political and
civil society spheres. The negotiations centered on territorial and security issues
(mainly Ukraine’s neutrality), but Russia also made demands regarding Ukrainian
state-society relations. For example, in draft peace agreements discussed in
2022, Moscow demanded the recognition of Russian as a state language and the
repealing of legislation limiting its use in state, education and media. Additionally,
Russia sought a ban on “aggressive nationalism”, the repeal of Ukraine’s post-
Maidan historical memory legislation, and the end of policies that it considered
discriminatory against the UOC-MP. Finally, another noteworthy element was the
call to repeal Ukraine’s 2014 so-called “Lustration Law”, which barred certain
categories of officials from the Yanukovych and Soviet eras from holding state
office for up to ten years (Surnachova 2024; The New York Times 2024a, 2024b).
A memorandum presented by the Russian government in June 2025 contained
similar provisions related to Ukrainian domestic issues (Russia 2025).
In Russian-occupied areas, efforts at ideologically legitimating Russian rule
were illustrated by a July 2022 manifesto which claimed that Russian rule would
bring freedom and prosperity after what was depicted as decades of oligarchic
exploitation, aggressive Ukrainian nationalism and repression of Russian language
and identity in independent Ukraine (Social Forum “We are together with Russia”
2022). In line with this narrative, Russian was declared a state language, while
Ukrainian became an optional subject in Russia-controlled schools. References to
Ukrainian national identity and especially Ukrainian nationalists were eliminated
from public space. Russia’s historical memory approach was adopted, as illustrated
by measures regarding placenames, public celebrations and monuments. Russian
curricula and teaching standards were implemented in schools and universities.
Pro-Russian ideologies were also disseminated through youth organizations
and a controlled media environment (Lewis 2025). The policies and proposals
mentioned above evidence the Russian government’s goal of transforming the
political order in Ukraine, showing how state-society relations have been perceived
by Russia as a relevant aspect of its Ukraine policy.
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5. Conclusion
Throughout history, great powers have often perceived state-society relations
in other countries as variables affecting the global balance of power. As this
paper showed, Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine can be understood as
an action driven by such considerations. In this sense, the invasion represents
the culmination of a process spanning the entire post-Soviet period in which
Russia sought to keep Ukraine in its claimed sphere of influence by, among other
means, engaging in state-society dynamics in Ukraine to influence the formation
of a friendly political order in the neighboring country. Initially stronger outside
government, proposals in this direction became increasingly present in Russian
foreign policy under Putin. In the context of the war, Russia’s regime change
goals and domestic policy demands in peace negotiations, as well as identity
policies and repression of Ukrainian opposition in Russian-occupied territories,
attest that changing state-society relations, and not only keeping Ukraine out
of NATO and disabling its military potential, was an important goal for Russia.
The preceding analysis contributes to refining certain aspects of the prevailing
realist, liberal and empire-centered interpretations about Russia’s full-scale
invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s actions indicate how state-society relations can
also be a component in states’ assessments of the balance of power—in addition
to material factors traditionally emphasized by IR realists—and the ability to
control peripheral spaces discussed in empire-centered and realist perspectives.
Finally, Russia’s attempts to establish a friendly political order in Ukraine, by
changing state policies and promoting the circulation of pro-Russian ideologies,
show how the liberal IR accent on domestic factors can be refined by drawing
attention to the historical co-constitution of state and society.
This article also offers some considerations on the consequences of the
war and possible scenarios of Russia-Ukraine relations. As national identity
and antagonism towards Russia have strengthened in Ukraine amid the war,
some political positions deemed pro-Russian have been delegitimized, with
various politicians of the traditional pro-Russian camp, including former OPZZh
members, adhering to such trends. Furthermore, several political parties have
been banned on charges of espousing pro-Russian views—including the OPZZh.
Although met with some domestic criticism, there have been state-sanctioned
efforts to remove Russia- and Soviet-associated symbols from Ukrainian cities.
Finally, despite officially declaring a break with the ROC, the UOC-MP has
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been subject to pressure and may be prohibited. These developments point to
an increased willingness in Ukraine’s civil and political society to regulate the
limits of acceptable political positions and ideologies in ways that run counter
to Russia’s interests.
On the other hand, war fatigue in Ukraine has led to more openness to
concessions. Additionally, the US under the Trump administration has signaled
its intention to reduce military support for Ukraine and urged Kyiv to make
concessions while engaging Russia in peace talks. This context may help Russia
achieve some of its goals. Illustratively, a peace plan proposed by the Trump
administration in November 2025, in addition to security-related provisions such
as keeping Ukraine out of NATO and limiting the size of its military, addressed
issues related to Russia’s positions regarding national identity policies and the
holding of elections in Ukraine (Ravid and Lawler 2025). Nonetheless, from a
state-society relations perspective, a likely medium and long-term consequence of
the war will be the further strengthening of national identity, pro-Western views
and negative attitudes towards Russia in Ukraine’s society. These factors can
contribute to reduce Russia’s influence in Ukraine and affect Moscow’s balance
of power considerations, therefore potentially renewing the political struggles
of the 2014-2021 period in Russia-Ukraine relations.
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