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Felipe Leal Ribeiro de Albuquerque
A cooperative Global South?
Brazil, India, and China in multilateral regimes
Um Sul Global cooperativo?
Brasil, Índia e China em regimes multilaterais
DOI: 10.21530/ci.v11n1.2016.350
Felipe Leal Ribeiro de Albuquerque
1
Abstract
Differently from the Cold War, emerging powers currently have chances to put forward their
foreign policy goals. In their rise, countries such as Brazil, India, and China opted to follow
similar sets of strategies within multilateral regimes. Ranging from blocking and free riding to
cooperative behaviors, these states have enhanced their ability to promote topical changes in
existing institutional settings. It does not mean, however, that their developing condition will
necessarily prompt them to cooperate. As this paper will point out by means of a comparative
analysis of the regimes of nuclear non-proliferation, peace and security, and climate change,
these countries have more chances to cooperate when their interpretations of the principles
and norms that compose a regime converge. Relying on how a country interprets normative
frameworks and on the degree of membership a state has in a regime, this article challenges
the notion that these three leaders of the so-called Global South would be relying on an
all-encompassing cooperative multilateral behavior
Keywords: Multilateralism; Regimes; Brazil; India; China.
Resumo
Diferente da Guerra Fria, as atuais potências emergentes têm maiores condições de levarem
adiante suas preferências de política externa. Em sua ascensão, países como Brasil, Índia
e China optaram por seguir estratégias semelhantes em regimes multilaterais. Variando
de bloqueio e free-riding a comportamentos cooperativos, tais estados expandiram suas
1 Research Assistant/ Ph.D. candidate; Marie Curie Fellow; Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa
(ICS-UL) – felipe.albuquerque@ics.ulisboa.pt.
Artigo recebido em 07/03/2016 e aprovado em 03/06/2016.
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A cooperative Global South? Brazil, India, and China in multilateral regimes
capacidades de promover mudanças tópicas em arranjos institucionais existentes. Isso não
significa, entretanto, que sua condição emergente vá necessariamente levá-los a cooperar. Como
este artigo demonstrará, por meio de análise comparativa dos regimes de não proliferação
nuclear, paz e segurança, e mudança do clima, esses países têm mais chances de cooperar
quando suas interpretações dos princípios e normas que compõem um regime convergem.
Baseando-se em como um país interpreta arcabouços normativos e no tipo de filiação que
um estado tem um regime, este trabalho contesta a noção que esses três líderes do suposto
Sul Global estariam alicerçados em um amplo comportamento multilateral cooperativo
Palavras-chave: Multilateralismo; Regimes; Brasil; Índia; China.
Introduction
2
One of the key debates of today’s international relations is whether emerging
powers
3
will accept, reject or try to modify Western-centered norms, principles,
rules, and decision-making procedures that sanction and guide state behavior.
4
This narrative has come to the top of the agenda with the current diffusion of
power and the relative ascensions of Brazil, China, and India. Their rise, which
is associated with their enhanced economic and political clout, however, is
substantially different from past attempts to gain more relevance. During the Cold
War, developing countries aimed to shape what they judged as an unequal world
order. They vocalized their preferences through groupings, for instance, the Non-
Aligned Movement, and the G-77, in which they uphold reformist stances such
as proposing a New International Economic Order (NIEO).
These views, though, were not coupled with a material grounding and did not
benefit from a changing international landscape. Their uniting discourses were not
accompanied by effective actions, which left them with empty rhetoric. Currently,
emerging powers can perform in a different manner. They do so by combining
criticism concerning the global order with a wide-range set of strategies, namely:
setting coalitions; creating alternative multilateral arrangements;
5
threatening to
2 This research has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research,
technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 607133. The author is part of the Marie
Curie Initial Training Network PRIMO – Power and Region in a Multipolar Order.
3 Knowing their blurred conceptual boundaries, this article will use “developing powers” and “emerging powers”
interchangeably. Se: Destradi (2010).
4 Definition of regimes, according to Krasner (1982), that will be subject of the next section.
5 The adjective “multilateral” will be applied as an attribute of “regimes”. About the concept it comes from,
“multilateralism”, see: Keohane (1990) and Ruggie (1992).
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Felipe Leal Ribeiro de Albuquerque
opt-out from negotiations; or gaining legitimacy by exerting a compromising role
between developed powers and least developed states.
On other words, such powers have more leeway to advance their foreign
policy goals, a phenomenon that is studied in a growing number of publications
that focus on countries from the so-called Global South.
6
Among the topics under
scrutiny, they generally converge on: these states’ challenging positions (Alden;
Vieira, 2005); ability to reshape global order (Terhalle, 2011); strategies and tactics
(Burges, 2012); how they have responded both to American hegemony and to
changes in international society (Hurrell, 2006); so as how the liberal international
order will be affected by their rise (Ikenberry, 2014).
As a matter of fact, regimes are, per excellence, where their readings of
international affairs encounter each other. In comparison to bilateral relations,
regimes guard a multilateral feature, which provides developing states more ground
to exert bargaining power. Also, regimes encompass a bulk of norms, principles,
rules, and decision-making procedures that regulate global affairs, which makes
them privileged loci for developing powers to act.
But do these states share common views? If so, what prompts them to
cooperate? Will they act accordingly just because they share a developing condition?
In contrary reasoning, if they are entities having distinct goals and strategies
and are facing diverse constraints, why they sometimes act together? This article
focuses on explaining why Brazil, India, and China collaborate in some regimes
while they act in discordance in others, challenging the notion that they would act
accordingly for their “Southern” condition. Through an analytical framework that
comprises contributions from regime and foreign policy theories, this work will
recur to two cases in which the three countries participate and exert influence:
the regimes of climate change and peace and security. A third case, the regime
of nuclear non-proliferation, will work as a control case study, as only Brazil and
China have formal membership in it.
By relying on documentation from international organizations, legal text
from treaties and related literature, the analysis will be centered on two main
indicators: (i) how these countries consider the norms and principles that build
the core of the mentioned regimes; and (ii) their relative positions and degree of
membership within such regimes. This paper will be divided in four sections: the
first will present two distinct branches of literature, on regimes and on foreign
6 The term “Global South” has roots on the conferences of Bandung (1955) and Belgrade (1961), so as on the
Non-Alignment Movement and the G-77. See: Cox (1981); Alden & Vieira (2005).
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A cooperative Global South? Brazil, India, and China in multilateral regimes
policy, showing the bridges that exist between them. The following section centers
on hypotheses, methods, and case-selection, while the last addresses the three
selected cases.
Regime theory
For the purpose of assessing whether and how Brazil, India, and China can
engage cooperatively in multilateral regimes, this section will rely on literature
on regime theory and on developing countries’ foreign policies.
Multilateral regimes
The most common reading of the concept of regimes is that they are principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations
converge in a given issue-area. The constituents of the word regime contribute to
its conceptual clarification. Principles are beliefs of fact, subjective constructions
of reality that can induce one to certain actions. Norms are standards of behavior,
defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules, for their turn, can enable or
obstruct the degree of agency one has. Decision-making procedures are prevailing
practices for making, implementing, and halting the achievement of decisions
(Krasner, 1983).
For its components, a regime is a multi-layered concept. The way one
perceives a regime shapes the way the analysis will be guided. Stein (1982), for
example, maintains regimes derive from countries’ voluntary agreements held
under anarchy.
7
Similarly, Haas (1982) understands regimes as byproducts of
individual calculations of benefits and costs. Actors provide collective goods only
to the extent they matches their own interests. A shift in these conditions would
consequently propel regime alteration.
8
A second group of scholars identifies regimes as the arrangements in which
state interactions take place. In this understanding, regimes are structures depicted
as intervening variables between basic causal factors i.e. the foreign policies of
states, and outcomes. For being the setups in which interstate relations occur,
regimes are a middle element in the chain of events that start with an individual
7 Krasner (1983) denominates this position “modified structured realism”.
8 For such authors, regimes are the outcomes to be analyzed.
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Felipe Leal Ribeiro de Albuquerque
decision and end with a result, being it cooperative or not. The problem with this
view is that is minimizes the importance norms, principles, rules, and decision-
making procedures have. For giving much emphasis to state agency, it diminishes
the fact states are constrained by the same rules they want to alter.
For a third group of scholars as the like of Oran (1982) and Puchala and
Hopkins (1982), notwithstanding, regimes both affect and are affected by states’
interactions. According to their view, regimes and individual behavior cannot be
analyzed separately due to the fact that they are inextricably linked: any changes
in one of them would lead to consequential alterations in the other. In the same
vein, such authors, whose theoretical contribution is associated with constructivist
intakes, consider states’ actions, as they are mediated by a multilateral architecture,
to be both enabling and constraining changes in the regime in question.
This article follows this last logic, assuming regimes as buffer zones that
impede or slow automatic changes. They provide stability in moments in which
power is becoming more widely dispersed (Krasner, 1983: viii), which dialogues
to current times. For this reason, it is not because the basic conditions are altered
that an outcome will necessarily follow through. In the realist tradition, a shift in
interests or capabilities would lead to unmediated and fixed results. As Krasner
(1983: 8) points-out, “pure power motivations preclude regimes”, but even though
a state may act solely on its interests, trying to skip from existing regimes, it would
still be framed by other international rules of conduct.
Figure 1. Analytical framework based on Krasner (1983)
Cooperation/
no cooperation
(outcome)
Structure
of
multilateral
regimes
Foreign
policy
preferences
(basic
conditions)
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A cooperative Global South? Brazil, India, and China in multilateral regimes
This article argues multilateral regimes are displayed, as in figure 01, as
the loci that facilitate international agreements, “making it easier for actors to
realize their interests collectively” (Keohane, 1982: 170). Also, their foreign policy
preferences do not carry non-mediated effects for the reason they are normatively
infused (Puchala and Hopkins, 1982). Consequently, this work departs from the
idea countries can cooperate depending on whether their views on the constituents
of a regime are or not in accordance. Thus, the sense they make of a specific norm
can enable them to jointly act.
Developing countries’ foreign policies
As mentioned, the concept of regime alone means little. It is by studying how
interactions happen within a regime that one can assess what explains emerging
powers’ cooperation. The way states perceive the elements that compose a regime
can ease their rapprochement. The commercial G-20, for instance, was crafted by
countries with a very narrow interest in safeguarding their advantages in agriculture
commerce. Their matching understandings of the trade regime were pivotal for
their coming together. Were their views unlike, they would hardly compose. Such
a trend has become more salient with the relative ascensions of states such as
Brazil, India, and China, countries that currently have more sway to transform
diplomatic rhetoric into action. This ultimately guides to a pluralistic world order.
It is within multilateral regimes that these encounters and dissonances occur,
since they provide live evidence for actual changes. In fact, alterations in the scope
of regimes are more feasible in situations of diffusion of power, as their components
become less coherent. Transformation reads in a twofold manner: (i) in the rules
and decision-making procedures within a regime, which produces change in the
regime; or (ii) in the fundamental principles and norms, characterizing a change
of the regime, a much more drastic effect (Krasner, 1983).
In difference to mainstream literature (Nye, 2015; Schweller, 2011), that places
emerging powers together as “contenders” or “challengers”, this piece upholds
they are not challenging multilateral regimes in their own existence, nor they are
necessarily engaging as a group. These countries do not wish to alter regimes in
essence, but to adjust their operational provisions and practicality. Generally, such
actors ask for more participation and recognition (Destradi, 2010), and do so not by
contesting norms and principles, but by reinforcing the rules and decision-making
that derive from them. Alternatively, they also try to alter such rules that were
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Felipe Leal Ribeiro de Albuquerque
primarily defined to fit the interests of the developed powers (Terhalle, 2011). Up
to this point, current global liberal order remains unmatched and no contending
options have been seriously considered.
Accordingly, with their enhanced weight, they bear more conditions to influence
current and future rules in multilateral regimes. Developing powers privilege these
arrangements for several reasons: (a) for regimes routinize contacts and dialogue,
making it easier for countries to vocalize positions. Furthermore, (b) as most
multilateral negotiations require consensus-making, developing states usually
combine forces in order to enable or block decisions. Relating to this, (c) they can
use their conditions as developing powers to intermediate negotiating positions
between developed and least developing countries, acting as “bridges” and gaining
legitimacy. In lieu of this, (d) developing countries can create alternative multilateral
institutions within a regime, without trying to restart its provisions completely, but
forcing them to change. BRICS’ New Development Bank is the pressing example.
As highlighted, such powers behave differently in several regimes. Reasons
vary for that, but normally range around some basic conditions: (i) their different
domestic institutions; (ii) how domestic elites and bureaucracies influence
governmental decisions; (iii) the impact of negotiations in their regional positions;
(iv) which “position” or membership they occupy within a regime; or (v) how
they view the norms, principles, rules, and decision-making procedures that form
a regime.
For reasons of parsimony and space limitation, this article will rely solely on
the basic conditions (iv) and (v).
Case-selection, hypotheses and method
This article chose three different cases, the regimes of climate change, nuclear
non-proliferation, and peace and security. All three fulfill the theoretical definition
of a regime. Bearing this in mind, the aim of this paper is not to ascertain how
regimes are created or what causes them to change. This would require a diverse
analytical path in which regimes would be seen as the outcomes to be explained.
As mentioned, the major objective here is to explain what prompts cooperation
between Brazil, India, and China, by assessing two basic conditions: their
positioning within the regime; and these countries’ views on norms and principles.
On the first basic condition, the positioning in the regime, it refers to the type
of membership a state has in relation to a treaty or institutional framework. For
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A cooperative Global South? Brazil, India, and China in multilateral regimes
instance, one country can keep a position at a high-level decision-making instance
such as the Security Council. Instead, it can be an ordinary member with sporadic
participation as a non-permanent member. Diverse types of membership also enable
different rights and obligations, such as the case of the Kyoto Protocol with Annex-I
and non-Annex-I Parties, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with nuclear
weapon countries and non-nuclear weapon countries. Largely, it is a structural-type
basic condition that dialogues with realist and liberal currents of International
Relations (i.e. Waltz, 1979). Associated with it lies the notion that fixed positions
can predetermine behavior.
The second basic condition refers to understandings Brazil, India, and China
sustain on the norms and principles of a regime, this same norms and principles
being the foundation of rules and decision-making dispositions. At its core, this
basic condition has a subjacent constructivist orientation, in reason it assumes
actors not only reproduce normative structures, but also interact and change them.
Following Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986: 770), states can alter these principles and
norms “by their very practice, as underlying conditions change, as new constraints
or possibilities emerge, or as new claimants make their presence felt”. Essentially,
by looking into interpretations of multilateral principles and norms, reasoning
follows an opposite direction from the aforementioned. The case studies of this
article will confront the two mentioned basic conditions.
All three cases have inner differences. These are regarded in how the regime
in question was structured and through which means Brazil, India, and China
relate in them. The analysis departs from the idea their strategies can convey or
divert, depending both on their views on the norms and principles that comprise
a regime, and on where they sit in the negotiation table.
Figure 2. Basic conditions, outcomes and case studies
Case studies/
regimes
Do they sit on the
same side?
Do they agree on
norms and principles?
Do they cooperate
multilaterally?
Non-proliferation No No No
Peace and security No Yes Yes
Climate change Yes Yes Yes
In this sense, two of the cases, the regimes of climate change, and peace and
security, have the basic conditions – as figure 2 shows – varying in a dissimilar
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Felipe Leal Ribeiro de Albuquerque
manner but resulting in a similar outcome. According to Seawright and Gerring
(2008), they fit the definition of most-different case designs, since the prime
variance in them occurs in the basic conditions while the outcome is the same.
In these two cases, just one causal basic condition varies in accordance to the
outcome.
Furthermore, the regime of nuclear non-proliferation functions as a control
case, since it adds up to the analytical core comprised by the two already mentioned
regimes and contributes for better evaluating the basic conditions. Although the
nuclear non-proliferation regime adjusts well with the definition of a regime, it
guards an inner difference from the other two, which is the non-membership of
India. This does not mean, however, that India cannot influence discussions.
Concisely, it makes an interesting control case because it provides to the test of
hypotheses and for the evaluation of the relationship between basic conditions
and outcome.
Among the three selected cases, the climate change regime is markedly the
one in which Brazil, India, and China often cooperate. Their collaboration is
visible through the formation of the BASIC, and in virtue of how they consider
the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”. Generally speaking,
they defend the maintenance of differentiation between them and the developed
powers and are against assuming mandatory carbon emission targets. Although
dissent can be manifested in some specific points, it does not undermine their
broader sense of cooperation.
The peace and security regime is an inquisitive choice because it demonstrates
the three countries can cooperate even if they occupy different positions in the
regime architecture. China being a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) and having veto power does not preclude Beijing from
cooperating with Brazil and India. Their joint abstention from the Resolution
1973/2011 is a paradigmatic example. Accordingly, the three powers do not want
to reform the bulk of the UN Charter, but to place boundaries in how humanitarian
interventions are operationalized.
Finally, Brazil, India, and China have little multilateral cooperation when it
comes to nuclear non-proliferation. First of all, India’s condition as an outsider
makes it a target for the two other countries. When it comes to NPT’s structure,
Brazil and China, as in the regime of peace and security, sit on opposite sides.
The difference here is that beyond being at contrasting poles, they also interpret the
norms and principles of the regime in a dissimilar fashion. While Brazil upholds
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A cooperative Global South? Brazil, India, and China in multilateral regimes
a systematic view of the NPT, China focuses its efforts mostly on horizontal non-
proliferation.
But what explains their cooperation? When it comes to hypotheses, the
first hypothesis (H1) is that the positions Brazil, India, and China occupy in a
multilateral arena is what explains their possibility of cooperation. In short, where
you sit is what propels your choices. By this reasoning, it would be expected that
a permanent member of the UNSC, be it developed or developing state, would
not share similar views with a non-permanent player. The same reasoning with
Annex I and non-Annex I parties in climate talks.
Lastly, the second hypothesis (H2) is that the way Brazil, India, and China
interpret the norms and principles that compose a regime is primarily what prompts
them to cooperate. Depending on their considerations, they are more prone to
defend similar positions. Their deliberations on a specific norm or principle are
revealed by how they behave multilaterally. Their foreign policy actions are the
empirical marks.
Brazil, India, and China in multilateral regimes
This section comprises the three case studies of this article, controlling for
the same basic conditions, and seeing whether they produce corresponding
outcomes.
The climate change regime
Cooperation between Brazil, India, and China is a common negotiation
feature of the climate change regime. All exerting leading roles at the G-77, such
countries underpin similar views on the norms and principles that compose
climate talks. Shared interpretations on the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR), the core of the regime, incited
the formation of the BASIC, a loose negotiating coalition that also includes
South Africa. The establishment of the BASIC at the Conference of the Parties
(COP) in 2009 changed talks, enhancing its members’ ability to shape outcomes
(Masters, 2012).
The principle of CBDR was brought about by the Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. Article 3 reads its central meaning: “Parties
should protect the climate system (…) on the basis of equity and in accordance
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Felipe Leal Ribeiro de Albuquerque
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”
(United Nations, 1992: 9, remarked).
9
The notion of CBDR inspired the Kyoto
Protocol and its division between Annex I and Non-Annex I states, with only the
former having compulsory carbon emission targets (Roberts and Parks, 2007).
Developing countries are also expected to contribute to curb climate change,
but only in accordance with their levels of economic growth and social development
(Carvalho, Azeredo and Lucero, 2015). In this sense, the principle of CBDR enabled
them to autonomously define their national climate policies and also served as
a “shield”, since the institutional set up of Kyoto exempted them from assuming
mandatory obligations.
The treaty division in annexes forced a North-South separation that, throughout
time, was not entirely in accordance with the growing emission profiles of several
developing countries, China being the best example (Hochstetler and Milkoreit,
2014). In addition, years after entering into force, in 2005, the Kyoto Protocol
already revealed to be anachronistic: it did not involve the U.S. or any major
emitter from the developing world. As years went by, the BASIC opted to keep
the discourse of historical responsibilities from the “North” and was able to avoid
any changes in CBDR (Vihma, 2011).
In this sense, the convening of the BASIC mainly responds to its members’
interest in keeping the greatest burden on developed countries. Facing external
pressures both from Annex I parties and from the more vulnerable least developing
countries, they formed a coalition in order to keep their existing advantages
(Hallding, Olsson, Atteridge, Carson and Román, 2011). Alongside the U.S. and
sidestepping the EU, the BASIC was key in brokering the agreement at the COP-
15 that avoided a foreseen failure in the multilateral process (Hochstetler, 2012).
Hence, all pertaining to the same non-Annex-I locus provided by Kyoto, Brazil,
India, and China have used their initial defensive involvement at the BASIC to
then proactively influence the climate change regime, for they intend to be seen as
cooperative stakeholders. Indeed, the BASIC not only brings developed powers such
as the U.S. to the negotiating table, but also pushes for an encompassing accord
that involves demands from the G-77.
10
Presenting itself as ready to engage and
9 Kyoto defined there should be accomplished a decline of over 5% in developed country emissions compared
to 1990 levels.
10 This is a common call in BASIC’s joint statements. Notwithstanding, Hallding, Jüsioo, Carson and Atteridge
(2013) argue BASIC members’ increasing wealth and power have made it hard for them to maintain a shared
“Third World” identity.
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A cooperative Global South? Brazil, India, and China in multilateral regimes
to contribute to a post-Kyoto world, the group combines both a will to slow down
alterations in the normative architecture of the regime and a desire to participate.
Prior to the convening for the COP-21, parties presented their Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). These documents bring their national
views and what they can actually do in order to add up to the global effort to
curb climate change. Not surprisingly, the INDCs from Brazil, India, and China
convey similar notions on how the sharing of responsibilities should be put in
motion. In Brazil’s INDC, there is a section named “historical responsibilities
and equity”. China, for its turn, urges developed countries to take the lead in
substantially reducing their emissions and in providing support. Similarly, India
stresses the importance of establishing an equitable global architecture based on
climate justice and on the principle of CBDR.
11
This does not mean, as expected, that their cooperation runs completely in
harmony. Their emissions patterns are extremely diverse,
12
and they disagree, for
example, in how they understand issues such as emissions measurement, so as
how the remaining carbon space should be shared between countries.
13
Whilst
India favors a per capita approach, Brazil and China favor historical emissions
(Hallding, Olsson, Atteridge, Carson and Román, 2011). More importantly, the
occasional differences do not harm the overall sense of collaboration. In the end,
nuanced disagreements are superseded by the will to keep the coalition and its
bargaining power standing.
Among all cases analyzed in this paper, this is the one that bears the greatest
degree of convergence between the three developing countries. They maintain
a general and lasting sense of cooperation. Essentially, Brazil, India, and China
are bounded together in reason of their common interpretations of the principle
of CBDR. Their struggle is to keep differentiation coupled with voluntary
contributions. Not having mandatory emission targets, which grants them a Non-
Annex I condition, adds up to this central explanation.
11 The Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012. The second commitment
period goes between 2013 and 2020. Thus, it is to be superseded by another protocol, legal instrument or an
agreed outcome with legal force applicable to all parties in the convention. For INDCs, see: www4.unfccc.int/
submissions/INDC, access on February 20
th
2016.
12 For GHG emissions, see The World Bank database: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.KT/
countries>, access on January 22
nd
2016.
13 Agarwal (2002) relates equity with shares of atmospheric space, which, widely speaking, are the “amount”
of carbon each country would have right to emit in order to assure its development. Audet (2013) argues the
BASIC holds a “conflict discourse” that articulates the North-South duality.
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Felipe Leal Ribeiro de Albuquerque
Peace and security
The peace and security regime has a clear institutional division between
Brazil and India, on the one side, and China, on the other. China’s condition
as a permanent member of the UNSC entitles it to veto power. Whenever its
interests are in place, Beijing can block possible binding Chapter VII resolutions,
which deals with the assurance of peace and security. Brazil and India, for
not having this advantage, have to rely on grouping together with permanent
members in the moments they exert a temporary mandate. Together in the UNSC
in 2011, all three along with Russia and Germany abstained from Resolution 1973
(RES 1973), which authorized member states to act in order to protect civilians
in Libya.
This case will be centered at the cooperative stances of Brazil, India, and
China solely at the UNSC in the year of 2011. Although looking into the UN General
Assembly would also reveal interesting insights on the (non-) convergence of their
foreign policies, the choice for the UNSC respects thematic, circumstantial, and
analytical reasons. In substantive terms, it is the UN body that primarily deals
with topics related to peace and security. Secondly, 2011 was the first moment
since the creation of the UN that Brazil, India, and China seated together at the
UNSC. This condition enabled them to conjugate positions towards the RES 1973.
Thirdly, in analytical terms, the peace and security regime is the only, in comparison
to the other two chosen for this article, in which the structural dimension
clearly states out for the three countries. In this sense, it adds up to the testing
of hypotheses.
In comparison to the climate change regime, a division of labor is clearer
in the peace and security arena. Whilst the Kyoto Protocol determined duties to
Annex I Parties, the UN Charter crystallized an institutional parting that entitles
different sets of rights for countries, according to their degree of membership,
which has practical consequences for interstate relations. Being a permanent
member goes beyond a condition, enabling actions such as the veto. According
to Dunne and Teitt (2015: 371), China has a “structural advantage” by virtue of
its membership condition.
Moreover, the structure of the peace and security regime is less flexible than
the other two dealt in this paper. This happens because any changes on its norms
and principles depend on the agreement and posterior ratification by the five
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A cooperative Global South? Brazil, India, and China in multilateral regimes
permanent members of the UNSC. Not by coincidence, the UNSC still reflects the
geopolitics of the post-World War II, as its reform plans are at standstill.
14
The peace and security regime is based on principles and norms derived
from the UN Charter, being the principles under article 2 (4) and article 1 (3) the
fundamental ones. While article 2 (4) prohibits the threat or use of force and claims
all parties to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence
of other states, article 1 (3) revolves around the principle of the promotion of human
rights.
15
Both principles are frequently in conflict,
16
and this tension was
brought into how the norm of Responsibly to Protect (R2P) is interpreted and
operationalized.
17
Finnemore (1996) argues that, in practice, the corollary for
intervention is near absolute rule to nonintervention. Garwood-Gowers (2013),
in contrary, defends it makes sovereignty more flexible.
18
The norm of R2P gained impulse in international debates with the growing
mass atrocities and threats to civilian populations in the 1990s and the 2000s, such
as the cases of Rwanda and Srebrenica. In 2001, the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) brought the debate away from notions on
the “right to intervene” and developed R2P as a concept enabling military action.
The proposal was met with suspicion by states that traditionally underscore the
importance of sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs, such as China.
In 2005, the UN General Assembly reframed discussions on the topic at the
World Summit Outcome, stating R2P as a concept built on “three pillars”: (i) the
pillar of the primary responsibilities of states to protect their population from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; (ii) the pillar
of the responsibility of the international community to assist states to fulfill their
obligations; and (iii) the pillar of the UNSC’s responsibility to undertake timely
and decisive response when states patently fail to protect their populations.
19
14 China does not support an enlarged UNSC membership, a desire Brazil and India hold together with Germany
and Japan at the G-4.
15 See: the UN Charter. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html>, access
on February 20
th
, 2016. Article 39 grants the UNSC a wide margin of discretion to ascertain what is a “threat to
the peace”. Article 51 allows for the individual or collective use of force by a state responding in self-defense
to an armed attack.
16 Finnemore (1996) compares realist, liberal, and constructivist views on humanitarian intervention.
17 There is still no consensus in the literature whether R2P is a principle or a norm. This paper considers it a
norm, as it derives from the principles under article 2 (4) and article 1 (3) of the UN Charter.
18 Breakey (2012) writes on the tension between both components of the concept.
19 Paragraphs 138, 139 and 140 of the World Summit Outcome. Available at: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/
ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf>, access on February 23
rd
2016.
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177
Felipe Leal Ribeiro de Albuquerque
Actions under this third and critical pillar can include non-coercive means, for
example, humanitarian assistance so as forcible measures such as sanctions or
the use of force (Dunne and Teitt, 2015). The 2009 UN document “Implementing
the Responsibility to Protect” focused on the operationalization of the R2P, adding
up to the normative core of it.
20
UNSC’s RES 1973 is a paradigmatic case in which conflict arose over the
implementation of R2P. It was edited after the unanimous adoption of resolution
1970, which recalled Libyan government’s responsibility to protect its population,
referred the situation to the International Criminal Court, imposed an arms embargo,
and restrictions on officials. Libyan authorities largely ignored the efforts. The UNSC
scaled up the tone with RES 1973, which imposed a no-fly zone over Libya,
authorizing member states to take “all necessary measures (…) to protect civilians”
(UN Security Council, 2011: 4). The resolution passed with 10 affirmative votes and
the abstentions of China, Russia, Brazil, India, and Germany. Afterwards, a NATO-
led coalition was composed to enforce the provisions.
The abstentions show these countries, even being reluctant on the content
of the resolution, could not vote against it. Indeed, China and Russia were unable
to exert the veto for reasons that range around: as there was real threat to the
civilian population in Libya, blocking the resolution would bring reputational costs
(Dunne and Teitt, 2015); there was regional consensus by the Arab League and the
African Union on the need of external intervention (Garwood-Gowers, 2013); and
the diplomatic ability displayed by France, the United Kingdom, and the United
States to obtain the approval of the resolution (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014).
It did not exempt countries such as Brazil, India, and China, though, from exerting
criticism on how the resolution was implemented.
Apart from reckoning the dire humanitarian situation of the Libyan population,
their criticism reflected common views on the principles of non-intervention and
non-use of force, evoked by article 2(4). For these states, the NATO-led operation
shifted from enforcing a no-fly zone to regime change. It was depicted as a
“cynical tool for the powerful” that moved away from and interpreted selectively
the dispositions of the RES 1973 (Rotmann, Kurtz and Brockmeier, 2014: 368).
For Brazil, one of the “fiercest Global South critics of the course of the Libyan
intervention” (Evans and Thakur, 2013: 207), measures approved could lead to
“unintended effects” to the aggravation of the conflict on the ground (Viotti, Dunlop
20 See: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/677>, access on February 25
th
2016.
178
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A cooperative Global South? Brazil, India, and China in multilateral regimes
and Fernandes, 2014: 507). This view led Brazil to circulate a concept note that qualifies
its support for R2P, bringing the idea of Responsibility While Protecting (RwP).
It states that “there is a growing perception that the concept of the responsibility
to protect might be misused for purposes other than protecting civilians, such as
regime change” (UN General Assembly, 2011: 3). The “proposed addendum” on
the concept of R2P focuses on guaranteeing clearer criteria and accountability in
humanitarian interventions led by the UN (Stuenkel and Tourinho, 2014).
21
In the Indian view, expressed through its ambassador Manjeev Singh Puri,
the resolution was not based on clear information, “including a lack of certainty
regarding who was going to enforce measures”.
22
The statement fits New Delhi’s
concerns about the West in consideration to the use of military intervention to
uphold the principles of R2P (Hall, 2013). This cautious position (Mohan, 2014)
well suits Brazil’s interpretation of R2P. According to Hall (2013), Indian arguments
invoke a reluctance to endorse new principles that formally question sovereignty,
so as anxieties about possible future threats to India’s own autonomy, given its
internal conflicts.
China’s position was complementary. To justify its abstention, its officials
mentioned the country was against the use of force when peaceful measures
were not exhausted. Beijing faced the resolution with “serious difficulty” and
not blocked it “because it attached great importance to the requests of the Arab
League and the African Union”.
23
In this respect, although China’s stance on
intervention is lately becoming more flexible, it still takes a cautious approach
as regards intervening in domestic affairs of other states (Pang, 2009), especially
when it perceives a mismatch between means and ends, as in Libya (Dunne and
Teitt, 2015).
Coming to a conclusion, the convergent behaviors of Brazil, India, and China
in relation to the RES 1973 show that independent of their institutional condition
of membership at the UN, these countries have similar interpretations of the norm
of R2P. In the concrete case, their abstention demonstrates they can cooperate in
a multilateral regime irrespective of their relative positions. The common distrust
21 In broad terms, RwP operates as a corollary to the principle of R2P, making the use of force, if and when
authorized by the UNSC, as a last resort means of protection that should be employed in a predictable and
controlled manner.
22 See: “Security Council approves ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya”. Available at: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/
sc10200.doc.htm>, access on February 18
th
2016.
23 Idem.
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179
Felipe Leal Ribeiro de Albuquerque
Brazil, India, and China raised on the implementation of the norm of R2P in Libya
had unintended effects on debating other interventions, as in the Syrian case.
The non-proliferation regime
Cooperation between Brazil, India, and China is not a common feature in
the regime of nuclear non-proliferation, mostly, for they stand distinct views on
the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968. Two of the
players, Brazil and China, act in the opposite spectrum of negotiations within
the NPT. India, for its turn, is an outsider and also a nuclear power, making
common views even more improbable. As mentioned, this section will rely on
the non-proliferation regime as a control case study in comparison to the other
two previous cases.
To start with, the NPT recognized two categories of countries: nuclear
weapon states (“have”) and non-nuclear weapon ones (“have not”). This clear-cut
division largely fulfilled the interest of the nuclear weapon powers of the time.
In practical terms, the NPT crystallized power among the first five nuclear states
and permanent members of the UNSC, acknowledging such states with the right
to possess nuclear-weapon technology. The main goal of the NPT was to avoid
horizontal nuclear proliferation, something it largely failed to accomplish, since
other countries succeeded in developing nuclear expertise (Verdier, 2008).
In broad terms, the non-proliferation regime leaves little space for non-
nuclear weapon states to put forward their preferences. In such arena, there are no
North-South negotiating blocs as happens in climate talks, and topics are more
related to security concerns, leaving less ground for flexibility. States not having
nuclear weapons do not have material capabilities to fundamentally influence
talks. Existing groupings, such as the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and the Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), exert limited pressure.
The way the non-proliferation regime was structured precludes non-nuclear
weapon states from changing the existing rules or proposing new ones that aim
towards a less unbalanced system. As any amendments on the NPT need the
acquiescence of the nuclear weapon states, it ends up being a firewall to possible
changes. The nature of the regime only leaves space for weak declarations of
intentions and action plans proposed by the non-nuclear weapon states, which
constantly fall short in their objectives.
180
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A cooperative Global South? Brazil, India, and China in multilateral regimes
The NPT is unevenly structured on three pillars: (a) horizontal non-proliferation
(articles I, II and III of the treaty); (b) use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
(articles IV and V); and (c) vertical non-proliferation, or disarmament (article VI),
being this last one the center of the disputes between non-nuclear weapon states
and nuclear weapon states within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Article VI reads that: “Parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures (…) [to] complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control”.
24
Apart from being based on three pillars, the regime is mostly focused on the
first one, of horizontal non-proliferation.
25
This situation fulfills the core interest
of the nuclear weapon states: prevent other countries from being able to develop
nuclear capabilities. The framework provided by such pillar follows the realistic
thinking of the Cold War.
The second and third pillars are concessions made by these states to their
non-nuclear weapon peers. Such dispositions made the NPT possible, but did not
receive the same attention. This happens for two main reasons: (i) nuclear weapon
players do not want other states to freely develop nuclear technology, which
could be eased by civilian nuclear cooperation, as the second pillar shows. Other
states, by mastering the expertise, could achieve nuclear latency and imperil the
dominance of the former; (ii) the third pillar, disarmament, if properly followed,
would erase their material advantage.
Therefore, the regime is divided, on the one side, by five countries that
primarily underpin the implementation of the first pillar, among them China,
and, on the other, by states that defend a comprehensive observance of the NPT,
such as Brazil. This political separation exists because the norms and principles
the treaty creates are not entirely followed. In the 2000 NPT Review Conference,
for instance, the New Agenda Coalition championed by Brazil proposed “thirteen
practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article
VI”, which involves, among others, the entry into force of the Comprehensive
24 The non-proliferation treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968, entered into force in 1970 and was expected to endure
until 1995. The Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, in this same year, decided the treaty should
continue in force indefinitely. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html>, access
on 14
th
February 2016.
25 The Additional Protocol of 1997 expands IAEA’s ability to strengthen the regime through tougher verification
measures. It provides the authority to visit any facility, declared or not, of the signatories and to investigate
states’ nuclear declarations.
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Felipe Leal Ribeiro de Albuquerque
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); and the principle of “irreversibility to apply
nuclear disarmament” (United Nations, 2000). The effort had feeble effects and
the regime was kept unbalanced. The fundamental problem, therefore, is that the
three pillars, albeit written law, are not empirically respected.
Brazil historically considered the NPT to be a legal instrument in the hands
of the nuclear powers, separating the world in “responsible” and “irresponsible”
actors.
26
Alongside India, the South American country remained decades outside
of the regime, which arose suspicious of an undercover uranium enrichment
program. It only ratified the NPT in 1998 and never accepted its 1997 Additional
Protocol. Brasília underscores a strengthening of the mechanisms of verification
must be coupled by disarmament measures. Also, it denies unbridled verification
by the IAEA, for fears of industrial spying on its indigenous nuclear program for
peaceful purposes.
For Brazil, the fulfillment of article VI is a condition for the regime to function
(Brasil, 2015). Without effective progress in disarmament measures, country
officials argue, the two other pillars cannot be assured, which would perpetuate
an unjust order (Kassenova, 2014). In the same vein, Brazil criticizes the lack of
ratification of the CTBT by the U.S. and China. For such reasoning, the country
stays on the opposite side of China at the negotiating table. As they have clear
differences on how they perceive the regime, their chances of collaboration are
remote.
27
With its nuclear test in 1974, India joined the other five nuclear states, but
remained an outlaw of the regime, never signing the NPT.
28
In fact, it started
suffering considerable pressure to accept the normative framework provided by
the treaty. Pressures were placed on India not only by the nuclear-weapon states,
but also by the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), such as Brazil.
Following the Indian explosion of a nuclear device, the NSG imposed a three-
decade embargo on civilian nuclear trade with the country.
For its dual condition of not being a member of the NPT and having nuclear
armament, India is more interested in negotiating its status as a nuclear weapon
26 On the origins of Brazil’s nuclear program, see: Mallea, Spektor and Wheeler (2015), and Jesus (2012).
27 Their distinct views are clearly seen in the passing of the UNSC’s Resolution 1929/2010 on Iran’s nuclear
program. While Brazil voted against the resolution, China voiced for its adoption. On the Iranian case, see:
Tourinho (2015).
28 Fuhrmann (2009) writes on the origins of India’s nuclear program.
182
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A cooperative Global South? Brazil, India, and China in multilateral regimes
state than in making the regime work properly. Since it is not legally bounded
by the NPT, it develops its nuclear program without much constraint and do not
intermesh with spats caused by the division of the treaty in three pillars. In fact,
taking advantage of its geopolitical weight and regional positioning near China,
India has opted to negotiate its nuclear cooperation mostly with the U.S. In 2008,
following heavy campaigning pressure from New Delhi and Washington, and for
the displeasing of China, the country received a waiver from the NSG’s embargo.
Perkovich and Acton (2009: 28) advocate India has a “tradition” for championing
nuclear disarmament that mounts back to Nehru’s government. Apart from rhetoric,
this is hardly seen in practice. Differently from Brazil, however, India’s status as
a nuclear weapon power grants it more means to negotiate. Also, tensions with
Pakistan and the desire to seek great power status preclude the country from
pursuing its own nuclear disarmament.
Lastly, China has acquired nuclear capability in 1964, pledging it would
use its nuclear arming only in self-defense and never to deploy them on non-
nuclear weapon states.
29
Being one of the five permanent members of the UNSC
and holder of a nuclear arsenal, Beijing calculates its position vis-à-vis the other
nuclear weapon powers, namely the U.S., which partly explains why it has not
ratified the CTBT (Pang, 2009). It plays a zero-sum game with Washington and also
Moscow when it comes to implementing disarmament. As progress on the issue
is mediocre, it sits on a different side of the nuclear spectrum as regards Brazil.
Final remarks
This article shows there is no pattern of dissent or cooperation between Brazil,
India, and China in the multilateral sphere. The degree to which their foreign
policy agendas can converge in the interpretation of the norms and principles
that compose a regime is what ultimately contributes for them to cooperate.
Consequently, what matters is not so much the topic of the regime being discussed
or in which position they “sit” when negotiating global issues. These factors are
important and play a role in defining their external positions, naturally, but are
not essential for cooperation to be achieved, as the cases in this piece show.
29 Hymans (2012) writes on China’s nuclear program.
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Felipe Leal Ribeiro de Albuquerque
Figure 3. Views on multilateral regimes’ normative frameworks
Case studies/
countries' objectives
Brazil India China
Non-proliferation
Respect the full
implementation of
the NPT
Free-ride/be seen
as an equal nuclear
weapon state
Status-quo nuclear
weapon state
Poce and security
Limit interpretations
on R2P
Limit interpretations
on R2P
Limit interpretations
on R2P
Climate change Keep CBDR Keep CBDR Keep CBDR
The major factor that explains if they are or not prone to jointly engage is
how they interpret the norms and principles that compose a regime, which comes
back to the second hypothesis (H2) raised in this piece. How they analyze the
way such norms and principles should be operationalized in practice has proven
to be decisive in answering the questions of this study. Considering the role of
their respective foreign policies is pivotal, since they bridge the path between
rhetoric and empirics. When these countries’ views on such fundamental basics do
not match, they tend to uphold diverging stances, irrespective of the topic being
discussed and the structure of the regime they are in. Hence, it is not because
they pertain to the allegedly Global South that they would necessarily cooperate,
as the non-proliferation case shows. This assumption corroborates the point that
their international behaviors are not pre-determined by their developing condition.
The way they interpret the composing norms and principles of a regime
is a sufficient condition for them to join forces and enhance bargaining power.
Conformity can bring about change, prompting an evolution of the regime in
question, or keep the status quo, stalling variation in them. Climate change is an
illustrative example, since it was the pairing up of Brazil, India, and China that
kept differentiation as the basic foundation of the regime. Were their positions
apart in such core issue, more pressure could be placed on them to assume
binding emission targets. Furthermore, debates on the practices of the UNSC
may not have occurred if these three countries haven’t shared criticisms on the
intervention in Libya.
To conclude, the nature of the regime, the other hypothesis (H1) of this
paper, is not as important as how states’ foreign policy preferences intertwine
in the interpretation of normative frameworks, which stresses the centrality of
184
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A cooperative Global South? Brazil, India, and China in multilateral regimes
the constructivist thinking in foreign policy for this specific study. As long as
the analytical framework developed in this article is contingent to the acting of
Brazil, India, and China and the mentioned three cases, a valid endeavor would
be to test it in other regimes these countries participate, or even with different
groups of countries. The effort could prove positive for further works to test the
assumptions raised in these lines.
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