Armamentos Nucleares: Dissuasão e Guerra Nuclear Acidental

  • Eugenio Diniz Professor do Departamento de Relações Internacionais da Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais — PUC Minas.
Palavras-chave: Dissuasão e Estabilidade Nucleares, Proliferação e Não-Proliferação de Armamentos Nucleares, Estudos Estratégicos, Guerra Nuclear

Resumo

Aborda-se o problema dos supostos benefícios à segurança internacional que adviria da eventualidade de que aumentasse a quantidade de Estados nuclearmente armados, em função do alegado valor dissuasório que lhes seria intrínseco. A questão é discutida integrando-se as literaturas sobre dissuasão e sobre os riscos de guerras nucleares impremeditadas, articuladas pela discussão das necessidades técnicas e estratégicas de procedimentos e recursos de Comando e Controle (C2), incluindo os aspectos relacionados a alerta antecipado e a capacidade efetiva, segura e garantida de lançar um ataque caso se decida por fazê-lo. Expõem-se os componentes de uma capacidade nuclear plena; as condições necessárias para que possa haver uma dissuasão nuclear mútua e estável em oposição aos incentivos para um primeiro ataque e aos riscos de “lançamento-ao-primeiro-sinal”; e em que medida tais dinâmicas podem ou não contribuir para uma maior estabilidade política. A conclusão geral é que, na ausência de capacidades de C2 e de alerta antecipado robustas, complexas, avançadas e caríssimas, a segurança de um país é na verdade diminuída pela obtenção de armamentos nucleares, e o risco de guerras nucleares impremeditadas aumenta significativamente; além disso, contrariamente à sabedoria convencional, todos esses perigos são ainda maiores para países pequenos ou pobres que para países grandes ou ricos. Armamentos nucleares, por si mesmos, não diminuem a diferença entre ricos e pobres; ao contrário, aumentam-na.

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Biografia do Autor

Eugenio Diniz, Professor do Departamento de Relações Internacionais da Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais — PUC Minas.
Professor do Departamento de Relações Internacionais da Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais — PUC Minas; membro do International Institute for Strategic Studies — IISS (Londres); membro do Grupo de Estudos Estratégicos — GEE; Pesquisador 1C do Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico — CNPq; Presidente da Associação Brasileira de Relações Internacionais — ABRI no biênio 2015-2017.

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Publicado
30-04-2016
Como Citar
Diniz, E. (2016). Armamentos Nucleares: Dissuasão e Guerra Nuclear Acidental. Carta Internacional, 11(1), 9-62. https://doi.org/10.21530/ci.v11n1.2016.472
Seção
Artigos