Estados frágeis e proliferação nuclear: uma agenda de segurança pós-Guerra Fria

  • Raquel Gontijo
Palavras-chave: Proliferação nuclear, estados frágeis, não-proliferação, consequências da proliferação, segunda era nuclear.

Resumo

Após o fim da Guerra Fria, a questão da proliferação nuclear ascendeu na agenda de segurança internacional. Central para este debate é a possibilidade de emergirem Estados nucleares frágeis, cuja potencial instabilidade política doméstica colocaria em risco o controle estatal sobre o arsenal nuclear e sobre materiais e tecnologias sensíveis. Desta forma, é possível que Estados frágeis, ao adquirirem armamentos nucleares, representem uma ameaça mais séria à segurança internacional do que Estados mais estáveis. Este artigo discute, então, a emergência dos Estados proliferadores frágeis como um tema fundamental da agenda nuclear. A primeira seção traz uma contextualização desse tema no contexto internacional pós-Guerra Fria. Em seguida, discutimos o significado de Estados frágeis e de suas políticas proliferadoras. Posteriormente, discutimos as consequências da proliferação nuclear, debate que não se restringe ao problema dos Estados frágeis. Após essas discussões teóricas, nos voltamos para a discussão de um exemplo de Estado proliferador fraco, com uma apreciação do programa nuclear do Paquistão, que pode ser considerado, entre os atuais Estados com capacidade nuclear, o caso emblemático de um Estado frágil. Finalmente, concluímos com uma reflexão sobre a importância das políticas internacionais de não-proliferação e de desarmamento.

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Biografia do Autor

Raquel Gontijo
Doutoranda em Relações Internacionais no Programa de Pós-Graduação San Tiago Dantas (UNESP, UNICAMP, PUC-SP).

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Publicado
31-08-2016
Como Citar
Gontijo, R. (2016). Estados frágeis e proliferação nuclear: uma agenda de segurança pós-Guerra Fria. Carta Internacional, 11(2), 28 - 52. https://doi.org/10.21530/ci.v11n2.2016.479
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